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The Right, the Test, and the Vote: Evaluating the
Reasoning Employed in Crawford v. Marion County
Election Board
"It is beyond cavil that voting is of the most fundamental
significance under our constitutional structure."1
I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Byron White's words from Burdick v. Takushi make a
powerful statement about the importance of the right to vote in our
unique democracy. However, several state legislatures have
recently implemented increasingly restrictive regulations on this
right. Perhaps the most restrictive of such regulations are those that
require citizens voting in person to present government-issued
photo identification. 2 In 2005, the Indiana legislature passed Senate
Enrolled Act No. 483 ("SEA 483"), resulting in the most
significant nationwide impact of any recent election regulation.
3
Following its enactment, various plaintiffs brought two separate4
suits in an effort to have SEA 483 declared invalid. These two
cases were later consolidated into a single case-Crawford v.5
Marion County Election Board. On review, the United States
Supreme Court upheld SEA 483 as constitutional. However, the
constitutionality of voter identification statutes such as SEA 483
must also be examined in light of the tests that have traditionally
been applied in cases involving elections and the right to vote. This
Note examines the significance of Crawford and argues that the
plurality should have applied a heightened scrutinN analysis, as set
forth in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, instead of the
balancing test from Anderson v. Celebrezze. Part II explores the
fundamental nature of the right to vote and the legal precedent
regarding elections and voting. Part III discusses each opinion set
Copyright 2010, by KELLY E. BRILLEAUX.
1. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1967) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Ill. Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173,
184 (1979)).
2. See GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-417 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 168.523 (2008).
3. Indiana State Senate Enrolled Act, 2005 Ind. Acts page no. 483,
available at http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2005/SE/SE0483.1.html.
4. Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775 (S.D. Ind. 2006);
Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 375 F. Supp. 2d 788 (S.D. Ind. 2005).
5. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1614 (2008).
6. Id.
7. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
8. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
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forth in the Crawford decision. Part IV analyzes the reasoning
employed by the Supreme Court and proposes that a heightened
scrutiny test be used in its place. It also addresses the possibility of
a "severe burden" requirement in order for the Court to apply
heightened scrutiny in election cases. This Note concludes that the
Court erred in its use of the Anderson test in Crawford and that the
statute would have been held unconstitutional if the Court had
instead applied heightened scrutiny. The Note also concludes that
the imposition of a severe burden requirement for heightened
scrutiny would be inappropriate, for a number of reasons.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The significant history and development of the right to vote are
established within the United States Constitution and Supreme
Court jurisprudence. While the Constitution implies the existence
of the right to vote, jurisprudence-especially throughout the past
fifty years-has developed the standards of review applicable to
the right.
A. The Right to Vote in the Constitution
While there are constitutional amendments that regulate the
right to vote, the precise nature of the right must be determined
primarily from the structure of the Constitution itself.9 Article I,
Section 2 of the Constitution provides that "[tihe House of
Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every
second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in
each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the
most numerous Branch of the State Legislature."' 0 Additionally,
Article II, Section 1 delegates to the states the power to establish
the method of selecting electors during a presidential election."
While it appears that the Constitution initially conferred matters
9. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV (the right of citizens to vote cannot be
denied on account of "race, color, or previous condition of servitude"); U.S.
CONST. amend. XIX (the right of citizens to vote cannot be denied on account of
sex); U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI (the right of citizens who are eighteen years of
age or older to vote cannot be denied).
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
11. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. Specifically, this provision states that "[e]ach State
shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of
Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the
State may be entitled in the Congress. . .." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
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relating to the franchise of voting upon the states, 12 changes began
to occur with the passing of constitutional amendments regarding
states' rights and the right to vote. 3
In 1868, the nation adopted the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution. 14  The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees
constitutionally protected rights to all citizens and restricts the
states from any action that would deprive citizens of those rights.
15
In the context of voting, the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment has been interpreted to protect United
States citizens' right to vote.' 6 The Fifteenth Amendment to the
Constitution was adopted in 1870 and states that "[t]he rights of
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude."' 7 Consequently, the Fifteenth
Amendment effectively established a federal interest in an area that
had traditionally been conferred upon the states.' 8  The
Constitution's indirect approach to addressing voting rights has
allowed the judiciary to interpret this constitutional basis and
provide a more thorough explanation as to the nature and
application of this right.
B. Jurisprudential Standards Regarding the Right to Vote
The ambiguity surrounding the constitutional source of voting
rights gave rise to the need for Supreme Court decisions
12. David Schultz, Less Than Fundamental: The Myth of Voter Fraud and
the Coming of the Second Great Disenfranchisement, 34 WM. MITCHELL L.
REv. 483,488 (2008).
13. Id.
14. The amendment states, in pertinent part, that "[n]o State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States . . .nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
15. See generally Adam B. Wolf, Fundamentally Flawed: Tradition and
Fundamental Rights, 57 U. MIAMI L. REv. 101, 103 (2002) ("The Fourteenth
Amendment was enacted to free Americans from the shackles of government-
sponsored oppression....").
16. See Matthew Michael Calabria, Remembering Democracy in the Debate
Over Election Reform, 58 DuKE L.J. 827, 847 (2009) (discussing the
government's protection of the franchise as an example of its protection of the
ideals of democracy (citing Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000) and Harper v.
Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966))).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
18. See also Schultz, supra note 12, at 488 (discussing the series of
constitutional amendments addressing the right to vote, including the Fifteenth,
Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments, but acknowledging that none of the
amendments "affirmatively granted the right to vote").
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interpreting the nature of the right to vote. However, it was
necessary not only for the Court to determine whether the right
was fundamental, but also to delineate the applicable standards of
scrutiny that should be used when determining the constitutionality
of statutes that burden the right to vote. 19
Fundamental rights are generally entitled to a high level of
judicial scrutiny because of the traditional importance with which
society regards their value.20 Yet, there is currently some debate
concerning both the source and nature of fundamental rights. Many
theories exist regarding the source of rights that are not expressly
provided for in the Constitution-also called unenumerated
rights-that have resulted in great difficulty when trying to
ascertain "one unifying principle for assessing the fundamentality
of rights. 21 In determining which rights are fundamental in nature,
Justice Cardozo proposed that a right is fundamental "when
infringement upon the alleged right would 'offend some principle
of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people."
22
Modem jurisprudence has established that both the Equal
Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protect fundamental rights.23 The Equal Protection
Clause typically applies to discrete and insular minorities;
however, it also offers heightened protection for fundamental
rights.24 Because of this, the doctrines of equal protection and
19. See, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
20. See Wolf, supra note 15, at 107-08 ("[T]radition is the current, generally
accepted methodology for assessing purported fundamental rights ... .
21. Id. at 106.
22. Id. at 110 (quoting Synder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
23. Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, Substantive Due Process and Equal
Protection in the Fundamental Rights Realm, 33 HOw. L.J. 287, 290 (1990). As
far as due process is concerned, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence has
established that "the Due Process Clause should embrace more than certain
procedural safeguards." Wolf, supra note 15, at 108. Under this theory of
substantive due process, the states may not infringe upon those rights of citizens
that are protected by the Due Process Clause. See Nathan N. Frost, Rachel Beth
Klein-Levine & Thomas B. McAffee, Courts Over Constitutions Revisited:
Unwritten Constitutionalism in the States, 2004 UTAH L. REv. 333, 341 (2004)
(describing substantive due process as a judicial function that "discovered
'fundamental rights' to be protected by due process clauses of state and federal
constitutions"). Recently, this theory has been used almost exclusively to declare
the rights of the family and the right of privacy as fundamental. See, e.g.,
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
702 (1997); Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
24. Mayer-Schonberger, supra note 23, at 291. The origins of the equal
protection doctrine can be found in Footnote 4 of United States v. Carolene
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substantive due process may overlap when dealing with
fundamental rights.25 When analyzing regulations that infringe
upon rights protected by the Due Process Clause26  and
fundamental rights in an equal protection context,27 the Court often
applies a "strict" or "heightened" level of scrutiny. 28 Under the
strict scrutiny analysis, courts make a two-part inquiry.2 9 First, a
court must ask whether there is a compelling government interest
that supports the challenged regulation. 30 Second, the court must
determine whether the regulation is sufficiently narrowly tailored
to serve this compelling interest.31 This approach also requires a
court to "assess the relative 'weights' or dignities of the contending
interests ....,,32
Although the Supreme Court had engaged in some discussion
of voting rights in its early decisions,; the Court did not
Products, which implied that a "more exacting judicial scrutiny" might be
necessary for legislation that restricts certain political processes. 304 U.S. 144,
152 n.4 (1938). See also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)
(holding an Oklahoma law that required the sterilization of habitual criminals
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause because the legislation
"involve[d] one of the basic civil rights of man").
25. This was the case in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, which seemed
to employ the principles of substantive due process within the framework of an
equal protection analysis. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). The Harper Court's approach in
combining these two doctrines indicates that both doctrines may apply when
evaluating a provision that imposes a burden on the right to vote.
26. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment
"'forbids the government to infringe ... fundamental liberty interests at all, no
matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest"' (internal quotations omitted)).
27. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1968) (applying strict
scrutiny to the fundamental right to travel in the context of welfare assistance).
28. See infra note 50.
29. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 772 n.12. The Court described the
"'compelling interest test,' under which regulations that substantially burden a
constitutionally protected (or 'fundamental') liberty must be narrowly tailored to
serve a compelling state interest." Id. (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302
(1993)).
30. See id. at 766. The Court noted that when "interests in liberty [are]
sufficiently important to be judged fundamental," a state may only prevail "on
the ground of an interest sufficiently compelling to place within the realm of the
reasonable a refusal to recognize the individual right asserted." Id. (internal
quotations omitted) (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 548 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
31. Id. at 766-67 (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)
and Flores, 507 U.S. at 301-02).
32. Id. at 767.
33. See, e.g., Ex parte Yarborough, 110 U.S. 651, 657 (1884) (discussing
the power of the government to secure elections from the influence of violence,
2010] NOTE 1027
8LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
affirmatively address the constitutional protection of the right to
vote until the 1940s.34 In United States v. Classic,35 the issue
presented itself in the context of criminal allegations of voter fraud
in a federal election. 36 The Court framed the constitutional issue as
"whether the right of qualified voters to vote in the Louisiana
primary and to have their ballots counted is a right 'secured by the
Constitution . . . . "'37 The Classic Court held that federal primary
elections fall within the reach of the constitutional provision and
are thus subject to congressional regulation.38 Observing the text of
Article I, Section 2, which provides that congressional
representatives are to be chosen by the people of the states by
electors, the Court reasoned that "[tihe right of the people to
choose, whatever its appropriate constitutional limitations[,] ... is
a right established and guaranteed by the Constitution and hence is
one secured by it to those citizens and inhabitants of the state
entitled to exercise the right. 3
9
The constitutional protection of the right to vote in federal
elections was upheld in Reynolds v. Sims, in which the Court held
that, under the Equal Protection Clause, both houses of a bicameral
legislature have to be apportioned on the basis of population.4 ° In
its equal protection analysis, the Court focused on whether the
record displayed any discrimination that impermissibly interfered
with the plaintiffs' constitutionally protected right to vote.4' The
Court stated:
Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental matter
in a free and democratic society. Especially since the right
to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner is
corruption, and fraud); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1874) (holding
that the Constitution does not confer the right of suffrage on anyone and that
state laws that give the right exclusively to men are constitutionally valid).
34. Schultz, supra note 12, at 488.
35. 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
36. Id. at 307.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 320.
39. Id. at 314.
40. 377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964). The plaintiffs alleged that the Alabama
legislature failed to reapportion state voting districts despite uneven population
growth. Id. at 540. As a result, they argued, voters were denied equal suffrage in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Id.
41. Id. at 561. The Court characterized the issue as one that "involves one of
the basic civil rights of man ..... Id. (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535, 541 (1942)). This parallel drawn between the voting issues in Reynolds and
the issue in Skinner-the right to procreate-indicates the Court's belief that the
right to vote is fundamental. Schultz, supra note 12, at 489.
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preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any
alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be
carefully and meticulously scrutinized.42
Following the Court's decisions in Classic and Reynolds, it was
established that the right to vote in federal elections is protected by
the Constitution. However, questions regarding the constitutional
protection of voting in state elections, the nature of the right to
vote, and the appropriate standards of scrutiny remained
unanswered until the Court's decision in Harper v. Virginia Board
of Elections.43
In Harper, Virginia residents sought to have a state poll tax
declared unconstitutional." The Virginia Constitution mandated
the tax, which required voters to pay an annual fee of $1.50. 4' The
Harper majority first addressed the nature of the right to vote. The
Court observed the provisions of Article I, Section 2, noting that
while the right to vote in federal elections is conferred, there is no
mention of the right to vote in state elections.46 The Court asserted
that the right to vote in state elections is implied by the First
Amendment and cannot be conditioned on the payment of a tax.
47
It further reiterated the principle that the "political franchise of
voting" is a "fundamental political right, because [it is] preservative
of all rights.' 48 The right to vote was thus categorized by the
Supreme Court as "fundamental."4 9
The Harper Court then had the task of determining the
appropriate standard of scrutiny to be used in assessing the
constitutionality of the poll tax. The Court acknowledged that the
principles of "close scrutiny" apply in cases involving fundamental
rights and liberties asserted under the Equal Protection Clause and
42. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561-62. See also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330, 336 (1972) (reiterating the assertion that the right to vote is a fundamental
political right).
43. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
44. Id. at 664.
45. Id. at 665 n.1.
46. Id. at 665.
47. Id
48. Id. at 667 (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
49. Id. Modem jurisprudence has affirmed the Harper Court's assertion that
voting is a fundamental right. See, e.g., Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780,
788 (1983) ("[T]hese rights of voters are fundamental.. . ."); Bullock v. Carter,
405 U.S. 134, 142-43 (1972) ("The initial and direct impact of filing fees is felt
by aspirants for office, rather than voters, and the Court has not heretofore
attached such fundamental status to candidacy as to invoke a rigorous standard
of review.").
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that those principles were applicable to the issue at hand.5 ° It also
asserted that the Court "ha[d] long been mindful that where
fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the Equal
Protection Clause, classifications which might invade or restrain
them must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined." 51 The
Court concluded that the Equal Protection Clause restricts the
states from5 2 enacting voter qualifications that invidiously
discriminate. Holding the Virginia poll tax unconstitutional, the
majority concluded its opinion by proclaiming, "[W]ealth or fee
paying has, in our view, no relation to voting qualifications; the
right to vote is too precious, too fundamental to be so burdened or
conditioned.
5 3
In the years following Harper, litigation concerning the right to
vote continued without significant change. 54 The next landmark
case in voting and election-related jurisprudence was Anderson v.
Celebrezze, which dealt primarily with the issue of ballot
access. 56 The petitioner was an independent presidential candidate
50. Harper, 383 U.S. at 670 (1966). Notably, in its determination of the
applicable standard of scrutiny, the Harper Court did not use the phrase "strict
scrutiny." The Court stated instead that fundamental rights under the Equal
Protection Clause must be "closely scrutinized and carefully confined." Id. It
can be inferred from the Court's language, however, that the standard employed
by Harper was something approaching strict scrutiny. It may be debatable what
differences-if any---exist between "strict" scrutiny and "heightened" or "close"
scrutiny. Presumably, and for the purposes of this Note, heightened scrutiny
employs the same considerations as strict scrutiny when contemplating the
constitutionality of a provision.
51. Id. at 670.
52. Id at 666. The Court also noted that "the interest of the [s]tate, when it
comes to voting, is limited to the power to fix qualifications." Id at 668.
53. Id. at 670.
54. Two Supreme Court decisions in the 1970s illustrated the Court's
efforts to assess a state's attempts at preventing voter fraud under the Harper
standard. Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, Voter Fraud or Voter Defrauded?
Highlighting an Inconsistent Consideration of Election Fraud, 44 HARv. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 1, 13 (2009). In Dunn v. Blumstein, the Court held unconstitutional
a Tennessee statute that required voters to reside in the state for one year before
being permitted to vote in the state. Id. at 13-14 (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330, 352 (1972)). Although the state asserted an interest in preventing voter
fraud by non-residents, the Court reasoned that "the Tennessee law was not the
'least restrictive means necessary for preventing fraud."' Id. at 14 (quoting
Dunn, 405 U.S. at 353). The next year, the Court decided Marston v. Lewis,
which upheld an Arizona statute requiring a fifty-day residency requirement for
voter registration. Id at 14 (citing Marston v. Lewis, 410 U.S. 679, 681 (1973)).
The Court's reasoning showed high deference to "amply justifiable legislative
judgment" that the requirement would reduce voter fraud. Id. (quoting Marston,
410 U.S. at 681 ).
55. 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
56. Id.
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who, because of an early filing requirement for independent
candidates in the Ohio Revised Code, was precluded from
appearing on the Ohio ballot. 57 The Court framed the issue as
whether the early filing requirement placed an "unconstitutional
burden on the voting and associational rights of Anderson's
supporters.
58
Although the deadline directly impacted only the independent
candidate himself, the Court asserted that "'the rights of voters and
the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation;
laws that affect candidates always have at least some theoretical,
correlative effect on voters."' 59 The Court reasoned that the issue
should be examined in light of its impact on voters because the
restrictions reduce the choices available to them.60 Discussing
these implications, the Court added in a footnote that it based its
conclusions "directly on the First and Fourteenth Amendments"
and did not "engage in a separate Equal Protection Clause
analysis."
61
Reasoning that challenges to state election laws cannot be
resolved with a "litmus paper test," the Court set forth a new
balancing test to analy2e "challenges to specific provisions of a
[s]tate's election laws":6
2
Instead, a Court must resolve such a challenge by an
analytical process that parallels its work in ordinary
litigation. It must first consider the character and magnitude
of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and
57. Id. at 782-83.
58. Id. at 782.
59. Id. at 786 (quoting Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972)). The
Court stated that "[a]lthough these rights of voters are fundamental, not all
restrictions imposed by the states on candidates' eligibility for the ballot impose
constitutionally-suspect burdens on voters' rights to associate or to choose among
candidates." Id. at 788. It supported this assertion by reasoning that a certain
amount of election regulation is required by the government in order to assist the
democratic process. Id. (citing Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)).
60. Id. at 786.
61. Id. at 786 n.7. The footnote stated in full that:
We rely, however, on the analysis in a number of our prior election
cases resting on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. These cases, applying the "fundamental rights" strand of
equal protection analysis, have identified the First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights implicated by restrictions on the eligibility of voters
and candidates, and have considered the degree to which the [s]tate's
restrictions further legitimate state interests.
Id.
62. Id. at 789 (quoting Storer, 415 U.S. at 730). The Court stated that such
challenges cannot be resolved by a test "that will separate valid from invalid
restrictions." Id.
2010] NOTE 1031
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Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to
vindicate. It must then identify and evaluate the precise
interests put forward by the [s]tate as justifications for the
burden imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the Court
must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of
each of those interests, it must also consider the extent to
which those interests make it necessary to burden the
plaintiff's rights. Only after weighing all these factors is the
reviewing Court in a position to decide whether the
challenged provision is unconstitutional.63
Applying this balancing test, the Court held that the burdens
placed on the Ohio voters' freedom of choice and freedom of
association outweighed the state's minimal interests.64 Anderson
thus initiated the Court's shift from a heightened to a more flexible
standard of scrutiny in election-related cases. Even though the facts
of Anderson dealt with the issue of a political candidate's ballot
access, 65 the open-ended language of its new balancing test
allowed for varying applications with regard to voting in
subsequent jurisprudence.
Nearly ten years after Anderson, the Court restated the
balancing test in Norman v. Reed.66 Norman involved a complex
set of facts arising from an Illinois election law regarding the
formation of new political parties.67 Citing the test set forth in
Anderson, the Court restated the standard, asserting that:
[T]o the degree that a [s]tate would thwart this
[constitutional] interest, by limiting the access of new
parties to the ballot, we have called for the demonstration
of a corresponding interest sufficiently weighty to justify
the limitation, and we have accordingly required any severe
restriction to be narrowly drawn to advance a state interest
of compelling importance.68
63. Id.
64. Id at 806. The Court first examined the potential burdens on independent
voters, discussing the significance of time in elections campaigns, specifically in a
presidential race. Id. at 790-92. The Court then weighed these impacts against the
state's asserted interests. Id. at 796. The state identified three main interests with
respect to the early filing deadline for independent candidates, including voter
education, political stability, and "equal treatment for partisan and independent
candidates." Id. Under this analysis, the Court found each of the state's interests
inadequate to justify the law. Id at 796, 799, 805-06.
65. Id. at 782-83.
66. 502 U.S. 279 (1992).
67. Id. at 282-84.
68. Id. at 288-89.
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The Norman Court ultimately held that the Illinois Supreme
Court's construction of the law unconstitutionally violated the
rights of the petitioners to the ballot.
69
Just months after the Court's distinctive construction of the
Anderson balance in Norman, it extended the application of the test
even further.70 The petitioner in Burdick v. Takushi was a Hawaii
citizen concerned with the state's policy regarding write-in
voting.7 1 The Court began by stating that the "[p]etitioner proceeds
from the erroneous assumption that a law that imposes any burden
upon the right to vote must be subject to strict scrutiny."72 It
continued by stating, "It is beyond cavil that 'voting is of the most
fundamental significance under our constitutional structure.' It
does not follow, however, that the right to vote in any manner and
the right to associate for political purposes through the ballot are
absolute."
73
Discussing the need for the government's role in regulating
elections, the Court asserted that all election regulations impose
some sort of burden upon individual voters. 74 Citing Anderson, the
Court called for the application of a "more flexible standard. ' 75 It
discussed ballot access procedures in relation to the potential
burdens on the petitioner.76 The Court noted the petitioner's
69. Id. at 289, 293-94.
70. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
71. Id. at 430. The petitioner originally wrote to Hawaii officials asking
about this policy and, upon learning that there was no provision on write-in
voting, filed suit in district court. Id. In his suit, the petitioner claimed that "he
wished to vote in the primary and general elections for a person who had not
filed nominating papers and that he wished to vote in future elections for other
persons whose names might not appear on the ballot." Id.
72. Id. at 432.
73. Id. at 433 (quoting 111. Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440
U.S. 173, 184 (1979) and citing Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S.
189, 193 (1986)).
74. Id. The Court argued that "the mere fact that a [s]tate's system 'creates
barriers . . . tending to limit the field of candidates from which voters might
choose ... does not of itself compel close scrutiny."' Id. (quoting Bullock v.
Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972)). The Court then asserted, "[T]o subject every
voting regulation to strict scrutiny and to require that the regulation be narrowly
tailored to advance a compelling state interest, as petitioner suggests, would tie
the hands of [s]tates seeking to assure that elections are operated equitably and
efficiently." Id.
75. Id. at 434 (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788-89
(1983)). The Burdick Court stated that "[u]nder this standard, the rigorousness
of our inquiry into the propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent
to which a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment
rights." Id.
76. Id. Concluding that Hawaii's election system generally provided "easy
access" to the ballot, the Court asserted that "any burden on voters' freedom of
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argument-that his case concerned voting rights, not ballot
access.77 However, responding- that the petitioner's argument was
based on a "flawed" premise, the Court explained that it had
"minimized the extent to which voting rights cases are
distinguishable from ballot access cases" because "the rights of
voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat
separation." 78 Using this reasoning, the Court ruled that "[t]he
appropriate standard for evaluating a claim that a state law burdens
the right to vote is set forth in Anderson."79 In closing, the Burdick
Court noted that "the right to vote is the right to participate in an
electoral process that is necessarily structured to maintain the
integrity of the democratic system" and upheld Hawaii's ban on
write-in voting as constitutional.8 °
Burdick, which was decided in 1992, was the last Supreme
Court opinion to significantly adjust the Anderson balancing test.8 1
Burdick furthered the shift to a more flexible standard of review by
applying the Anderson test to an issue more closely related to the
right to vote itself.82 The application of the Anderson test in
Crawford would ultimately prove to be the test's most expansive
and far-reaching application to date.
choice and association" was essentially the fault of those who did not recognize
their preferred candidate before the primary. Id, at 436-37.
77. Id. at 438.
78. Id. (citing Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972)).
79. Id, The Court further concluded that Hawaii's ban on write-in voting
imposed "only a limited burden on voters' rights to make free choices and to
associate politically through the vote." Id. at 438-39. The Court found that the
state's asserted interests were "sufficient to outweigh the limited burden" that
the law imposed. Id. at 440.
80. Id. at 441-42. The Court stated, "We think that Hawaii's prohibition on
write-in voting, considered as part of an electoral scheme that provides
constitutionally sufficient ballot access, does not impose an unconstitutional
burden upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the [s]tate's voters."
Id.
81. Following Burdick, however, the Court continued to hear cases
concerning elections and the right to vote. See, e.g., Wash. State Grange v.
Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008); Timmons v. Twin Cities
Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n,
514 U.S. 334 (1995).
82. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 438 (1992).
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III. CRA wFORD V. MARION COUNTY ELECTION BOARD
A. Factual and Procedural Background
In 2005, the Indiana legislature introduced SEA 483,83 which
amended a number of existing election provisions84 and enacted
three new provisions to be placed in the Indiana Code. 85 These
changes represented a significant shift from Indiana's prior
election procedures.86 The most significant aspects of these
provisions are the restrictive requirements for valid voter
identification 87 and the requirement of affirmative action by
voters-as opposed to the government-when a voter is unable to
produce the required form of identification.
88
The "proof of identification" _rovision sets out the
requirements for voter identification. It requires that "[t]he
83. Indiana State Senate Enrolled Act, 2005 Ind. Acts no. 483, available at
http://www.in.gov/legislative/bills/2005/SE/SE0483.1.html.
84. See IND. CODE ANN. §§ 3-11-8-25.1, -25.2, -25.5 (West Supp. 2008); id. §
3-11.5-4-16; id. § 3-11.7-2-3; IND. CODE ANN. §§ 3-11.7-5-2, -2.5, -3 (West
2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 9-24-16-10 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008); id. § 9-29-3-4;
id. § 9-29-9-15.
85. These new provisions include Indiana Code §§ 3-5-2-40.5, 3-10-1-7.2,
and 3-11.7-5-2.5.
86. "Under prior Indiana law, a voter seeking to vote in-person at a polling
place would be required to present himself or herself to the clerks and sign the
poll book." Ind. Democratic Party v. Rokita, 458 F. Supp. 2d 775, 788 (S.D. Ind.
2006). "There was no requirement that a voter show any form of identification
in order to vote after the prospective voter signed in with the clerk." Id.
Furthermore, before SEA 483, "Indiana law did not provide for the casting of a
'provisional ballot.' Instead, a member of the precinct election board, or the
election clerk, who wished to challenge the eligibility of a voter would be
required to swear out an affidavit under the penalties of perjury." Id.
87. IND. CODE ANN. § 3-5-2-40.5 (West 2006 & Supp. 2008). Compare LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:562 (Supp. 2010) ("Each applicant shall identify himself...
and present to the commissioners a Louisiana driver's license, a Louisiana special
identification card... or other generally recognized picture identification card that
contains the name, address, and signature of the applicant.").
88. IND. CODE ANN. § 3-11.7-5-2.5(B) (West 2006 & Supp. 2008). Compare
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18:562 (Supp. 2010) ("If the applicant does not have
[proper identification], the applicant shall sign an affidavit . . . to that effect
before the commissioners who shall place the affidavit in the envelope marked
'Registrar of Voters' and attach the envelope to the precinct register, and the
applicant shall provide further identification by presenting his current
registration certificate, giving his date of birth, or providing other information
stated in the precinct register that is requested by the commissioners. However,
an applicant that is allowed to vote without the picture identification required by
this Paragraph is subject to challenge as provided in R.S. 18:565." (emphasis
added)).
89. IND. CODE ANN. § 3-5-2-40.5 (West 2006 & Supp. 2008).
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document [show] a photograph of the individual to whom the
document was issued,"9 and that it "[be] issued by the United
States or the State of Indiana. ' 9' SEA 483 significantly amended
both the primary election92 and general election 93 procedures with
regard to voter identification in Indiana. Statutes governing each
type of election explain the procedures for entering polls and
instances in which a voter does not meet the photo identification
requirements. 94 According to these provisions: "A voter who
desires to vote an official ballot at [an] election shall provide proof
of identification ... before being permitted to sign the poll list."
'95
Both statutes allow for such a voter to execute a challenged voter's
affidavit, in which case a voter may "sign the poll list[] and receive
a provisional ballot., 96 Another newly enacted provision under
SEA 483 deals with the procedures to be followed after a voter
files the provisional ballot.9
7
90. Id. § 3-5-2-40.5(2).
91. Id. § 3-5-2-40.5(4).
92. Id. § 3-10-1-7.2.
93. Id. § 3-11-8-25.1.
94. Id. §3-10-1-7.2;id. § 3-11-8-25.1.
95. Id. § 3-10-1-7.2; see also id. § 3-11-8-25.1 (referring to general
elections). There is an exception to the general rule in both statutes, which is that
"[a] voter who votes in person at a precinct polling place that is located at a state
licensed care facility where the voter resides is not required to provide proof of
identification before voting in an election." Id. § 3-11-8-25. 1(c); see also id. § 3-
10-1-7.2(e) (referring to primary elections). Furthermore:
If. (1) the voter is unable or declines to present the proof of identification;
or (2) a member of the precinct election board determines that the proof
of identification presented by the voter does not qualify as proof of
identification under IC 3-5-2-40.5; a member of the election board shall
challenge the voter as prescribed by IC 3-11-8.
Id. § 3-11-8-25.1 (c); see also id. § 3-10-1-7.2(c) (referring to primary elections).
96. Id. § 3-10-1-7.2(d); id. § 3-11-8-25.1(d). This must be done in
accordance with Indiana Code § 3-10-1-9. Id. § 3-10-1-7.2(d); id. § 3-11-8-
25.1(d).
97. Id. § 3-11.7-5-2.5(b).
A voter who was challenged and... cast a provisional ballot... may
personally appear before the circuit court clerk or the county election
board no later than the deadline specified by ... IC 3-11.7-5-1 ... for
the election board to determine whether to count a provisional ballot.
Id. § 3-11.7-5-2.5(a). The deadline mentioned within this provision is "not later
than noon ten (10) days following the election." Id. § 3-11.7-5-1(b).
If the voter: (1) provides proof of identification to the circuit court clerk
or county election board; and (2) executes an affidavit before the clerk
or board ... affirming under the penalties of perjury that the voter is
the same individual who: (A) personally appeared ... and (B) cast the
provisional ballot on election day; the county election board shall find
that the voter's provisional ballot is valid and direct that the provisional
ballot be opened... and processed in accordance with this chapter.
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Following the introduction of SEA 483, various plaintiffs
brought two separate suits challenging its constitutionality. The
first was Crawford v. Marion County Election Board,9 8 in which
the plaintiffs challenged the voter identification requirement set
forth in SEA 483 on First and Fourteenth Amendment grounds,
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.99 The second suit,
Indiana Democratic Party v. Rokita (Rokita),100 addressed similar
challenges, including claims that the law violated the First and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, as well
as provisions of the Indiana Constitution.'
0
'
The district court in Rokita held that the plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate that strict scrutiny was warranted because they
"totally failed to adduce evidence establishing that any actual
voters will be adversely impacted by [SEA 483]." ' 102 The court
observed that "strict scrutiny of an election law is not warranted
merely because it may prevent some otherwise eligible voters from
exercising that right." r° 3 In granting summary judgment for the
defendants, 1°4 the court concluded that the photo identification
Id. § 3-11.7-5-2.5(b). These procedures for filing a provisional ballot are
described in § 3-10-1-7.2 and § 3-11-8-25.1. The same statute provides
exceptions to this procedure under certain circumstances. Id. § 3-11.7-5-2.5(c).
The exception provides that the voter must still appear before the clerk of court
or county election board, must execute an affidavit stating that the voter is the
same person that filed the provisional ballot, and must then execute an
additional affidavit stating that the voter is either "indigent and unable to obtain
proof of identification without payment of a fee" or "has a religious objection to
being photographed." Id. § 3-11.7-5-2.5(c). If the voter was only challenged
because of his failure to produce proof of identification, the provisional ballot
will then be deemed valid. Id. § 3-11.7-5-2.5(d).
98. 355 F. Supp. 2d 788 (S.D. Ind. 2005). The plaintiffs in this case were
two elected individuals, William Crawford and Joseph Simpson, as well as
several non-profit groups, and the defendant was the Marion County Election
Board. Id. Also named as defendants were the Indiana Secretary of State, Todd
Rokita, and the co-directors of the Indiana Election Division, J. Bradley King
and Kristi Robertson. Id.
99. Id.
100. 458 F. Supp. 2d 775 (S.D. Ind. 2006). This suit featured all of the same
plaintiffs from Crawford, along with additional plaintiffs, such as the Indiana
Democratic Party and the Marion County Democratic Central Committee. Id.
The defendants in this case again included Rokita, King, Robertson, and the
Marion County Election Board. Id.
101. Id. at 782. Plaintiffs and defendants filed cross motions for summary
judgment. Id.
102. Id. at 820.
103. Id. at 822.
104. Id. at 784.
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requirements under SEA 483 were "constitutionally permissible
[s]tate regulations of elections."' 0 5
From the Indiana district court ruling, the plaintiffs from Rokita
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, where the
case was renamed Crawford v. Marion County Election Board.1 0 6
The court rejected a heightened standard of scrutiny and instead
applied the test set forth in Anderson ° 7 and Burdick"°8 by
balancing the effect of requiring photo identification against the
interest in preventing voter fraud.'0 9 The Seventh Circuit
concluded that "[p]erhaps the Indiana law can be improved [but]
the details for election regulation must be left up to the states,
pursuant to Article I, section 4 of the [United States]
Constitution."" 0 With the judgment of the district court affirmed,
the plaintiffs once again appealed, and the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari."'
B. Plurality Opinion
On April 28, 2008, Justice Stevens delivered the plurality
opinion for the Supreme Court in Crawford.'1 2 He began by
discussing the standards set by the Court's election-related
jurisprudence. Justice Stevens first identified Harper,1 13 which
employed a strict standard in the context of the right to vote.' 14 The
105. Id. at 830.
106. 472 F.3d 949 (7th Cir. 2007). On appeal, the parties remained the same
as in Rokita, but the case was renamed. Id. In the opinion, the court noted that
the Democratic Party had standing because "most people who don't have photo
ID are low on the economic ladder and thus, if they do vote, are more likely to
vote for Democratic than Republican candidates." Id. The court concluded that
"the new law injures the Democratic Party by compelling the party to devote
resources to getting to the polls those of its supporters who would otherwise be
discouraged by the new law from bothering to vote." Id. at 951.
107. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).
108. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
109. Crawford, 472 F.3d at 952-53. In doing so, the court explained that
"[t]he argument pressed by the plaintiffs that any burden on the right to vote,
however slight it is or however meager the number of voters affected by it,
cannot pass constitutional muster unless it is shown to serve a compelling state
interest was rejected in Burdick v. Takushi." Id. at 952 (citing Burdick, 504 U.S.
at 433-34).
110. Id.at954.
11. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008). Oral
arguments were heard on January 9, 2008. Id.
112. Id. Justice Stevens was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Kennedy in the plurality opinion. Id. at 1613.
113. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
114. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1615 (citing Harper, 383 U.S. at 666).
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Court then discussed the balancing test promulgated in Anderson,
that "a court must identify and evaluate the interests put forward
by the [s]tate as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,
and then make the 'hard judgment' that our adversary system
demands."'1 5  The opinion also addressed Norman 16 and
Burdick,'"7 cases that both followed and interpreted the balancing
test employed in Anderson. 18 The Court closed its discussion of
these jurisprudential standards by relating back to the Harper
principle, under which state interests must be supported by
sufficiently weighty justifications to withstand constitutional
scrutiny no matter how slight the burden imposed by a law
restricting voting rights." 9
In applying the Anderson balancing test, the Court first
examined the interests asserted by the State of Indiana. 20 It noted
the state's valid interests in preventing voter fraud, increasing
election modernization, and securing voter confidence.' 21 With
regard to voter fraud, the Court pointed out that SEA 483 only
addresses in-person voter fraud and that there were no recorded
instances of such fraud in Indiana's history. 122 Although this lack
of recorded evidence arguably demonstrated a weakness in the
state's assertion of its interest, the Court concluded that "[t]here is
no question about the legitimacy or importance of the [s]tate's
interest in counting only the votes of eligible voters" after
evaluating evidence of in-person voter fraud in other states and
absentee ballot fraud within Indiana. 12
3
The Court then discussed the burdens upon voters that were
likely to result from enforcing SEA 483. It acknowledged that
although the photo identification requirement imposes some
unique burdens, the burdens that arise from "life's vagaries" are
not sufficiently 12serious or frequent to render SEA 483
unconstitutional.2 5 Examples of such scenarios include a voter
losing his driver's license on the way to the polls or no longer
115. Id. at 1616 (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 660 U.S. 780, 778 n.9
(1983)).
116. Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279 (1992).
117. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
118. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1616. The Court further noted that Burdick
applied the standard set forth in Anderson for "reasonable, nondiscriminatory
restrictions." Id. (citing Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1616-17.
121. Id. at 1617.
122. Id. at 1618-19.
123. Id. at 1619.
124. Id. at 1620.
125. Id.
2010] NOTE 1039
0LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
resembling the picture on the identification card. 126 The Court
identified a limited number of persons upon whom the laws would
impose a heavier burden, such as the elderly who would have
trouble locating a birth certificate if born out-of-state, persons with
economic and personal limitations who would be unable to acquire
a birth certificate or state-issued identification, the homeless, and
persons with religious objections to being photographed. 127 While
identifying these burdens, however, the Court also reasoned that
the stipulation allowing voters to cast provisional ballots mitigated
this "heavier burden."1,28 Concluding the burden discussion, the
Court opined that "[i]t is unlikely that such a requirement would
pose a constitutional problem unless it is wholly unjustified.' 129
After addressing the arguments of each party, the Court set out
to weigh the competing interests and determine the
constitutionality of SEA 483.' The Court stated that "[a] facial
challenge must fail where the statute has a 'plainly legitimate
sweep' and that it could not "conclude that the statute imposes
'excessively burdensome requirements' on any class of voters."'13
The plurality asserted that the petitioners were asking the Court to
"perform a unique balancing analysis that looks specifically at a
small number of voters who may experience a special burden
under the statute and weighs their burdens against the [s]tate's
broad interests in protecting election integrity."' 132 However, in
response, the Court stated that it was not possible to quantify the
magnitude of the burden imposed on the "narrow class of voters"
on the basis of the record. M The opinion concluded that "[t]he
application of the statute to the vast majority of Indiana voters is
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1621.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1622-23 (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 738 (1974) and
Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1190
(2008)). The Court noted that while partisan considerations may have played a
role in the enactment of the law, "if a nondiscriminatory law is supported by
valid neutral justifications, those justifications should not be disregarded simply
because partisan interests may have provided one motivation for the votes of
individual legislators." Id. at 1624. This was in response to the petitioners'
emphasis of the fact that the Republicans in the Indiana General Assembly
unanimously supported SEA 483, while every Democrat voted against it. Id. at
1623.
132. Id. at 1622.
133. Id.
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amply justified by the valid interest in protecting 'the integrity and
reliability of the electoral process.""
34
C. Concurring Opinion by Justice Scalia
Although Justice Scalia agreed with the plurality's conclusion
that SEA 483 was constitutionally sound, his concurring opinion
offered a different means of analysis to reach the same
conclusion.' 35 His opinion was based on the grounds "that
petitioners' premise is irrelevant and that the burden at issue is
minimal and justified.' 36 Justice Scalia's reasoning relied on the
approach set out in Burdick,137 which he characterized as requiring
the use of a deferential standard when dealing with important
regulatory interests. 38 Furthermore, Justice Scalia noted that
Burdick reserved strict scrutiny for cases in which the right to vote
is severely burdened, 39 as "[s]trict scrutiny is appropriate only if
the burden is severe."'
Justice Scalia also rejected the equal protection claim,
reasoning that "without proof of discriminatory intent, a generally
applicable law with disparate impact is not unconstitutional."'
The concurring opinion continued by criticizing the plurality's
"record-based" decision, arguing that it did not give sufficient
weight to legal precedent or provide any certainty for future
litigants. 142 The opinion concluded that the burden imposed by the
law was not severe, thus rendering strict scrutiny unwarranted, and
that the state's interests were sufficiently strong to overcome the
minimal burden. 143
134. Id. at 1624 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9(1983)).
135. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). Justices Alito and Thomas joined Justice
Scalia in the concurring opinion.
136. Id.
137. Burdickv. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
138. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1624 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Burdick,
504 U.S. at 433-34). Employing this standard, Justice Scalia determined that the
Indiana law was "generally applicable" and nondiscriminatory and that
individual impacts resulting from the law were not relevant in evaluating the
severity of the burden. Id. at 1625. Thus, Justice Scalia employed the Burdick
rule, showing deference to the state because it dealt with what he considered an
"important regulatory interest" and finding that strict scrutiny was unnecessary
because the burden on the right to vote was not severe. Id. at 1624.
139. Id. at 1624.
140. Id. at 1625 (quoting Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 592 (2005)).
141. Id. at 1626.
142. Id. at 1627.
143. Id.
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D. Dissenting Opinion by Justice Souter
The first dissent in the Crawford opinion was written by Justice
Souter. 144 He began by asserting that the Indiana law was
unconstitutional under the Burdick standard because "a [s]tate may
not burden the right to vote merely by invoking abstract interests,
be they legitimate . . . or even compelling, but must make a
particular, factual showing that threats to its interests outweigh the
particular impediments it has imposed.' 45 Justice Souter argued
that Indiana simply had not been able to justify the burden with
this required showing. 146 He also noted that voting rights cases
avoid "pre-set" levels of scrutiny due to the important competing
interests of the fundamental ripTt to vote and the government's
interest in regulating elections. 7 Instead, he explained, the Court
"favor[s] ... a sliding-scale balancing analysis: the scrutiny varies
with the effect of the regulation at issue.
' 141T
Justice Souter's dissent then analyzed the issue under the same
standard employed by the plurality-the Anderson balancing test
as interpreted by Burdick.' 9 He identified the three main factors
for review: the extent to which the law burdens First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights, the "character and magnitude" of
the asserted injury, and the number of voters likely to be affected
by the law. 150 He also looked to the provisional ballot exception
and noted the difficulty that a voter would incur in having to travel
to the clerk of court-located in the county seat--every time he
tries to vote. 151 Concluding that the law "threatens to impose
serious burdens on the voting right, even if not 'severe' ones,"
Justice Souter then sought to determine the number of individuals
144. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Souter in this
dissenting opinion.
145. Id,
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1627-28.
148. Id. at 1628. The opinion argued that although the plurality did not
completely abandon the jurisprudential principles in balancing the state's
interests and the petitioners' burdens, it failed to adequately assess the "hard
facts" required by the standard of review. Id.
149. Id,
150. Id. (citing Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) and quoting
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)). In evaluating the burdens
on the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, Justice Souter looked primarily
at the burden of traveling, as well as the travel costs and fees needed to obtain
photo identification. Id. at 1628-31. He noted that "in the Burdick analysis it
matters that both the travel costs and fees are disproportionately heavy for, and
thus disproportionately likely to deter, the poor, the old, and the immobile." Id.
at 1631.
151. Id. at 1631-32.
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that would likely be adversely affected by SEA 483.152 He
highlighted the district court's finding that 43,000 qualified voters
were without proper identification and argued that although the
figure must be adjusted due to the statutory exceptions, the state
did not-and could not---claim that this figure could be reduced to
an "insubstantial number.
1 53
Justice Souter conceded that he would "readily stipulate that a
[s]tate has an interest in responding to the risk (however small) of
in-person voter impersonation," but that the evaluation of a state's
interest must take into account both evidence and legislative
judgments. 154 He consequently reasoned that, on the basis of the
record, this asserted state interest could not be accorded any more
than "modest significance.' 5 5 He further argued that, based on the
record, the state's interest in the law did not outweigh the serious
burdens imposed on the right to vote. 156 "The calculation revealed
in the Indiana statute crosses a line when it targets the poor and the
weak," Justice Souter noted. 157 He concluded that "[t]he Indiana
Voter ID Law is thus unconstitutional: the state interests fail to
justify the practical limitations placed on the right to vote, and the
law imposes an unreasonable and irrelevant burden on voters who
are poor and old."'158
E. Dissenting Opinion by Justice Breyer
Justice Breyer wrote a separate dissent, suggesting a different
standard under which to determine the statute's constitutionality.1
5 9
Under Justice Breyer's view, the analysis should "balance the
voting-related interests that the statute affects, asking 'whether the
statute burdens any one such interest in a manner out of proportion
to the statute's salutary effects upon the others (perhaps, but not
necessarily, because of the existence of a clearly superior, less
restrictive alternative).)'' 160 Applying this standard, Justice Breyer
152. Id. at 1632.
153. Id. at 1633.
154. Id. at 1639.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1642-43.
157. Id. at 1643. Justice Souter further asserted that "[1ike that fee [in
Harper], the onus of the Indiana law is illegitimate just because it correlates
with no state interest so well as it does with the object of deterring poorer
residents from exercising the franchise." Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
160. Id. (quoting Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000)
(Breyer, J., concurring)).
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found the Indiana statute unconstitutional.161 He agreed with the
plurality in its view that "the Constitution does not automatically
forbid" Indiana from enacting a photo identification requirement
for election procedures. 162 However, Justice Breyer's dissenting
opinion expressed a different view on the appraisal of the severity
of burdens imposed by the law.
1 63
In formulating his separate dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer
primarily relied on the findings and recommendations of the
Carter-Baker Report. 164  Justice Breyer noted that without
convincing reason, Indiana had enacted a more burdensome
requirement than that recommended by the Carter-Baker report. 65
The opinion further observed that a non-driving voter would find it
particularly difficult and costly to travel to the Indiana Bureau of
Motor Vehicles, especially considering the number of counties in
Indiana without public transportation. Justice Breyer concluded
that "while the Constitution does not in general forbid Indiana
from enacting a photo ID requirement, this statute imposes a
disproportionate burden upon those without valid photo IDs."'
' 6 7
IV. ANALYSIS
The reasoning employed by the Crawford plurality essentially
amounted to an unwise extension of jurisprudence on voting rights
and election regulations. By extending the application of the
Anderson balancing test more than the Burdick Court, the
Crawford Court departed even further from the standard of
heightened scrutiny set forth in Harper. The use of the Anderson
balancing test was inappropriate in Crawford: instead, the standard
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1643-44.
163. Id. at 1644.
164. Id. at 1643-45. The Carter-Baker Report is a proposal by the Commission
on Federal Election Reform that recommended, among other things, that the states
require voters to present photo identification. COMM'N ON FED. ELECTION
REFORM, BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN U.S. ELECTIONS (2005). The Report proposed
the use of a "REAL ID" card-a state-issued driver's license or personal ID
card-for the purposes of voter identification. Id. at 19. The Commission made
two primary recommendations in recognition of the potential challenges presented
by the implementation of this new policy. First, it was recommended that the
policy be "phased in" over a two-year period. Id. Under this proposal, voters
would not have to travel to an election office to file a provisional ballot before
January 1, 2010. Id. Second, the states were recommended to provide the
identification free of charge and to make efforts to provide "convenient
opportunities" for citizens to obtain the identification cards. Id. at 20.
165. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1645.
166. Id. at 1644.
167. Id. at 1645.
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set forth in Harper should apply any time the courts review
provisions that directly burden the right to vote. Additionally, a
showing of a severe burden should not be required in order to
trigger heightened scrutiny.
A. Problems with the Use of the Anderson Balancing Test
The Court's use of the Anderson balancing test in Crawford
was erroneous for three essential reasons. First, the test itself was
created within the context of a case involving the issue of ballot
access, which is quite different from the issue of the fundamental
right to vote. Second, the vague language used by the Anderson
Court in the balancing test allowed for its misapplication in
subsequent case law, bringing it beyond the scope of the issue for
which it was originally intended. Finally, assuming arguendo that
Anderson was indeed the correct standard for evaluating SEA 483,
the test was incorrectly applied by the Crawford plurality.
1. The Development of the Anderson Balancing Test
In Anderson, the petitioner sought access to the Ohio ballot in a
presidential election as an independent candidate. 16 8 Although the
Court framed the issue in the context of "the voting and
associational rights of Anderson's supporters, ' 169 it later noted that
it based its conclusions "directly on the First and Fourteenth
Amendments., 170 Therefore, the Anderson Court specifically
addressed the First Amendment right of political association as
applied through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment when it developed its balancing test.
Anderson itself provides support for this proposition. The
Court's analysis of the Ohio statute asserted that the rights of
voters are fundamental, stating that "not all restrictions imposed by
the [s]tates on candidates' eligibility for the ballot impose
constitutionally-suspect burdens on voters' rights to associate or to
choose among candidates." ' 171 The Anderson opinion closed with
the statement that "[u]nder any realistic appraisal, the 'extent and
nature' of the burdens Ohio has placed on the voters' freedom of
choice and freedom of association... unquestionably outweigh the
168. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 782 (1983).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 788 n.7. The Court further stated that it relied on the equal
protection analysis employed in a number of prior election cases, which have
"identified the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights implicated by restrictions
on the eligibility of voters and candidates... ." Id.
171. Id. at 788 (emphasis added).
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[s]tate's minimal interest .... ,,172 The Anderson Court's mention
of "freedom of choice" refered to the fact that if additional
independent candidates were on the ballot, voters would ultimately
be given a greater number of candidates from which to choose
when casting their ballots. Thus, Anderson dealt with the issue of
ballot access, which most logically falls under the First
Amendment right of political association.
It was inappropriate to apply a test that was intended for ballot
access issues to a case dealing directly with the fundamental right to
vote. Due to the context of its development, the Anderson balancing
test was an inapposite model to be used when analyzing a provision
that directly burdens the right to vote. SEA 483 is not related to the
First Amendment right of political association. It does not limit a
voter's ability to associate with a particular party or vote for a
certain candidate. Quite differently, it is a direct burden on the right
to vote. The provisions of SEA 483 directly limit the ability of
otherwise-qualified voters to cast a vote in any election by creating
additional prerequisites to voter eligibility. 173 In doing so, SEA 483
and other voter identification laws present an issue that is different
from those addressed in the Anderson line of cases.
Notwithstanding the differences between the issues of ballot
access and the right to vote, the Anderson Court asserted that "'the
rights of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves
to neat separation; laws that affect candidates always have at least
some theoretical, correlative effect on voters."' 74 This statement
has the effect of grouping two distinguishable issues into a
seemingly indistinguishable class for the purposes of constitutional
scrutiny. Furthermore, it invites courts to apply the test to virtually
any scenario in which voting is at issue. Simply stated, the
Anderson test should not be applied to assess the constitutionality
of laws that directly burden the fundamental right to vote, such as
SEA 483 in Crawford, because it was developed to assess the
constitutionality of election laws relating to ballot access.
2. Vague Language of the Anderson Balancing Test and Its
Misapplication in Subsequent Jurisprudence
In addition to the troubles regarding the context of the
Anderson test's development, the language of the test itself raises
problems. The Anderson Court's choice of words renders the test
172. Id. at 806 (emphasis added).
173. See discussion supra Part III.A.
174. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 786 (quoting Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134,
143 (1972)).
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quite ambiguous. While the Court labeled the balancing test as an
"analytical process," 175 the Anderson opinion's explanation of the
analysis provides modest guidance as to how exactly a court is to
weigh the competing interests of both parties. For example, telling
courts to "consider the character and magnitude of the asserted
injury" and to "determine the legitimacy and strength of each of
those interests"' 76 does little to instruct them on the appropriate
level of deference to give each interest. The language of the
Anderson test consequently allows for the misinterpretation and
misapplication of the standard originally set by the Court. In fact,
the Anderson Court's use of vague language in developing the
balancing test did not merely subject the test to misapplication-it
resulted in the actual misapplication of the test in subsequent
jurisprudence.
In Norman, the Court rephrased the requirements of the
Anderson test, stating that when a state limits new parties to the
ballot, the Court has "called for the demonstration of a
corresponding interest sufficiently weighty to justify the
limitation."' ' 1 Although the Anderson test was already vague, the
Norman interpretation grossly oversimplified any helpful aspect of
the balancing test. By stating the Anderson balancing test as one
that simply calls for a corresponding interest to justify the
limitation, the test was transformed into one with little to no
resemblance to the original.
The most significant extension of the Anderson test, however,
took place in Burdick,178 which effectively increased the deference
given to an asserted state interest when evaluating an election
law. 179 The Burdick Court did this by emphasizing the importance
of government election regulation and reasoning that if strict
scrutiny were used every time that an election law was challenged,
it would have an impractical effect on the states.
18 °
Burdick further extended the Anderson test by holding that
"[t]he appropriate standard for evaluating a claim that a state law
burdens the right to vote is set forth in Anderson.' 81 With this
statement, the Court explicitly extended the application of the
Anderson balancing test far beyond ballot access issues. This
assertion by the Burdick Court relied in part on a phrase from
175. Id. at 789.
176. Id.
177. Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 288-89 (1992) (citing Anderson, 460
U.S. at 789).
178. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992).
179. Benson, supra note 54, at 15.
180. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433.
181. Id. at438.
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Bullock v. Carter, which stated that "the rights of voters and the
rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation."'
182
The Burdick Court believed that this statement had the effect of
"minimiz[ing] the extent to which votin, 83rights cases are
distinguishable from ballot access cases .... However, a clear
reading of Bullock shows that this statement was made in the
context of striking down a statute requiring candidates to pay a
filing fee because it would ultimately have a negative impact on
voters as well as candidates. 184 Thus, Bullock did not stand for the
proposition that voting rights cases should be assessed under the
same standards as ballot access cases. It instead sought to protect
the rights of voters by keeping the fundamental nature of their
rights in mind while deciding ballot access cases under a different
standard.
By ruling that the Anderson balancing test is the correct
standard to use in assessin any petitioner's claim that a state law
burdens the right to vote, 85 the Burdick Court misapplied the
Anderson balance-originally formulated to be used in the context
of ballot access issues-and extended its application to cases that
deal with the fundamental right of voting. This misapplication and
extension gave rise to the distorted version of the Anderson
balancing test used in Crawford. The Crawford Court's application
of this standard signified a considerable departure from the original
standard set forth in Anderson and an even bigger departure from
the heightened scrutiny standard employed in Harper.
3. Application of the Test in Crawford
Assuming arguendo that Anderson was the correct standard
under which to evaluate SEA 483, its use in Crawford remains
erroneous because of the Court's misapplication of the test itself.
In setting forth the balancing test, the Anderson Court stated:
[A court] must first consider the character and magnitude
of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to
vindicate. It must then identify and evaluate the precise
interests put forward by the [s]tate as justifications for the
burden imposed by its rule.
181
182. Id. (quoting Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 143 (1972)).
183. Id.
184. Bullock, 405 U.S. at 142-43.
185. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 438.
186. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983) (emphasis added).
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But the Crawford Court employed a procedure quite different from
this.
In Crawford, the Court began by listing the interests asserted
by the state as justifications for SEA 483.1 Only after evaluating
the state's interests did the Court address the potential burdens on
Indiana voters. 188 By approaching the analysis in this manner, the
Court failed to fairly evaluate the burdens alleged by the
petitioners. Instead, the Court essentially structured the analysis as
if it was giving great deference to the state-almost as if it was
putting the burden on the petitioners to prove that the state's
interests were insufficient. The Court did this not only by
discussing the state's interests before addressing the burdens on
voters, but also by directing more attention to the state's interests
and their potential impacts.' 89 However, as the wording of the
Anderson test clearly indicates, this is not the manner in which the
Court originally intended to conduct the balance. 190 Instead, a court
using the Anderson balance should first engage in a thorough
assessment of the "character and magnitude" of the burdens
asserted by petitioner and then weigh aainst those burdens the
precise justifications set forth by the state.
The Crawford Court also explicitly noted the lack of
evidence-both qualitative and quantitative-presented by the
state in support of its interest in preventing voter fraud, while still
finding this asserted interest sufficient to overcome the petitioners'
burdens. 192 In other words, although the record lacked substantial
evidence supporting the state's asserted interest, the Court
nevertheless found that the state had effectively demonstrated a
weighty justification for imposing a burden on the right to vote. By
taking this approach, the Crawford Court effectively abandoned
the essence of the somewhat subjective standard set forth by
Anderson-that the Court must engage in a precise and extensive
evaluation of each party's interests before assessing whether the
challenged provision violates the Constitution.' 93 In fact, the
187. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1616-20
(2008).
188. Id. at 1620-21.
189. Id. at 1616-20.
190. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789.
191. Id.
192. Benson, supra note 54, at 18.
193. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789.
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Court's reasoning in Crawford more closely resembled a rational
basis review 194 than the balancing test created in Anderson.
B. Finding the Appropriate Standard
Because the Anderson balancing test was erroneously applied
in Crawford, the determination of a different standard is necessary
to replace it. In making this assessment, the fundamental nature of
the right to vote and the importance that such status plays in
determining9 5 the appropriate standard of review must be
considered.
1. Circular Nature of "Sliding-Scale Scrutiny"
In his dissenting opinion in Crawford, Justice Souter noted that
voting-rights cases avoid "pre-set" levels of scrutiny.196 Instead, he
stated, the Court "favor[s] . . . a sliding-scale balancing analysis:
the scrutiny varies with the effect of the regulation at issue."
197
While it is true that the common law generally allows the courts to
decide the level of scrutiny on a case-by-case basis, this approach
is problematic in the context of voting rights. The inherently
political nature of provisions that infringe on the fundamental right
to vote provides a strong argument in favor of a set standard of
scrutiny in this context.
The Crawford plurality made note of the fact that partisan
considerations may have played a role in the enactment of SEA
483.198 The record revealed that every Republican in the Indiana
General Assembly voted in favor of the law, while the Democrats
unanimously opposed it.199 Thus, provisions that deal directly with
the right to vote are undeniably a political matter.2 °0 A set level of
scrutiny, then, would be most appropriate in this context.
194. Under the rational basis standard of review, the Court will uphold a
challenged statute if the state is able to assert a rational reason for its enactment.
See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927).
195. See discussion supra Part II.B.
196. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1628 (2008)
(Souter, J., dissenting).
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1624; see supra note 131.
199. Id. at 1623. This is in line with the popular belief that a higher voter
turnout typically favors the Democratic Party. See, e.g., Early Voting in Georgia
is High, MSNBC, Oct. 15, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/ 27201426/
("The high interest among black voters could yield a higher overall turnout,
which tends to favor Democrats.").
200. See, e.g., Sid Salter, Voter ID, Early Voting Intertwined as Partisan
Initiatives, THE MERIDIAN STAR, Dec. 30, 2008, available at http://www.
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Without such a rule, this amorphous "sliding-scale"
determination of scrutiny allows for the possibility that a court will
choose the level of scrutiny in an arbitrary manner. In other words,
because judges are not only permitted to decide the applicable
level of scrutiny for the regulation at issue, but are directed to do
so, they are able to pick the level scrutiny at their own whim.
Consequently, judges could choose the level of scrutiny based on
the outcome that they would ideologically prefer, essentially
rendering the outcome of the provision's analysis somewhat
predetermined. Under this scenario, the desired outcome would be
used to determine the applicable level of scrutiny, which would
subsequently be used as a justification for the outcome. Thus, the
sliding-scale approach is circular in its application.
With this in mind, and considering the importance of the right
to vote, it would be more appropriate to abandon the "sliding-
scale" scrutiny approach in favor of a rule requiring a set level of
scrutiny. Although, as Justice Souter noted, it is likely that the
parties on both sides of the argument have legitimate interests,201 a
set level of scrutiny would provide a more reliable means for
evaluating regulations that impose burdens on the right to vote and
would improve the consistency of decisions on the issue. Such a
rule would also prevent the appearance-and possibly the reality-
of a court's consideration of partisan motives when analyzing
regulations that burden the right to vote.
2. The Argument for Heightened Scrutiny
Considering that fundamental rights are protected under the
doctrines of either substantive due process or equal protection and
that both doctrines have traditionally triggered strict scrutiny when202
fundamental rights are involved, it follows that restrictions that
impose a direct burden on the fundamental right to vote should be
subject to a heightened level of scrutiny. As demonstrated by
Crawford, however, this is not the standard of review currently
employed by courts when dealing with this issue.2 °3 Despite the
recent shift to a more flexible standard, the Supreme Court should
return to the standard of review set forth in Harper and employ the
meridianstar.com/editorials/localstory_366002545.html ("Mississippi legislators
will find the contentious issues of voter identification and early voting politically
intertwined during the 2009 regular session.").
201. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1628 (Souter, J., dissenting).
202. See discussion supra Part II.B.
203. See discussion supra Part III.B.
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use of heightened scrutiny in the context of voting rights.
Heightened scrutiny would be most appropriate in consideration of
the fundamental nature of the right to vote and the public policy
surrounding the treatment of fundamental rights.
The Harper Court stated that the "political franchise of voting"
is a "fundamental political right, because [it is] preservative of all
rights. 20 4 This statement is significant not only because the Court
recognizes the right as fundamental, but also because it recognizes
that it is a "fundamental political right." While many of the
fundamental rights recognized by the Court are fundamental rights
of humans that are protected by the Constitution, 20 5 the right to
vote is somewhat different in nature because it is a fundamental
right of citizenship. Stated otherwise, the right is not inherently
protected on the basis of natural law, but is instead afforded
protection because of its significance within our democratic
society. The right to vote is "preservative of all rights" in that it
allows citizens to participate in the process of creating and
developing the policies under which they must abide.
The fundamental importance of the right to vote provides a
strong argument in favor of a heightened standard of scrutiny.20 6
While the government has an important interest in rep.ilating
elections to ensure efficiency and prevent voter fraud,2  these
interests alone should not serve as sufficient justification for
regulations that impose a burden by preventing otherwise-qualified
voters from exercising their right to vote. The right to vote is
simply too important to our nation's democratic ideals. Any level
of judicial scrutiny short of a heightened standard, though, allows
this result. In other words, unless heightened scrutiny is used to
evaluate the constitutionality of provisions that impose a direct
burden on the right to vote, the courts will give an inappropriate
level of deference to the government's interests and will
accordingly reduce the weight given to the asserted injuries to the
right to vote.
Consequently, the standard of heightened scrutiny set forth in
Harper is the standard that should prevail. By employing a
204. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (quoting Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
205. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261
(1990).
206. Under heightened scrutiny, the Court gives less deference to a state's
interest when assessing the constitutionality of a statute and instead requires that
the regulation be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. See
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 767.
207. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992).
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heightened scrutiny analysis, the courts can ensure that the
fundamental right to vote is not hindered by unnecessarily
restrictive state regulations. This return to a less deferential
standard will preserve the societal view on the importance of the
right to vote.
Considering the necessity of employing heightened scrutiny to
provisions that directly burden the right to vote, it should be
determined whether the Crawford Court would have reached the
same conclusion with regard to the constitutionality of SEA 483
under this standard. In the context of voting rights, a heightened
scrutiny analysis requires that the state assert a compelling interest
that is sought to be achieved through a restriction on the right to
vote and that the statute be sufficiently narrowly tailored to meet
that asserted interest.
In Crawford, the state asserted three primary interests in
support of SEA 483.208 These included election modernization20 9
and increasing voter confidence; 210 however, the state's primary
asserted interest was the prevention of in-person voter fraud.2'
The Crawford Court noted that there was "no question" about the
legitimacy of the state's interest in wanting to count "only the
votes of eligible voters."21 2 Indeed, preventing voter fraud is an
important and persuasive interest. Despite the fact that there were
no recorded instances of in-person voter fraud within the state of
Indiana, the record evidence of voter-fraud from other states
provided a convincing argument for the compelling nature of this
state interest.
213
Moreover, some unquestionably legitimate arguments support
the validity of SEA 483. It is supported not only by the interest in
preventing voter fraud, but also by the goals of improving election
modernization and securing voter confidence. SEA 483 essentially
waives the requirement of presenting government-issued photo ID
for elderly citizens in licensed care facilities 214 and arguably
provides a workable exception for those who are indigent or have
religious objections to being photographed. 215  Additionally,
208. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610, 1616-17
(2008).
209. Id. at 1617.
210. Id. at 1620.
211. Id. at 1618-20; see discussion supra Part III.B.
212. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1619.
213. Id.
214. IND. CODE ANN. § 3-10-1-7.2(e) (West 2006 & Supp. 2008); id. § 3-11-
8-25.1(c).
215. Id. § 3-11.7-5-2.5.
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Indiana is able to offer government-issued photo identification free
of charge to qualified voters.216
Even assuming that the interests asserted by the state in
Crawford may be deemed "compelling," the difficult part of the
heightened scrutiny analysis for the state is establishing that the
provision is sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve those
interests. Although a state may have valid and compelling
interests, the provision may be overly restrictive and therefore
unconstitutional under the heightened scrutiny standard.
When assessing SEA 483, the court of appeals stated in its
opinion that "[p]erhaps the Indiana law can be improved ....
This is the first indicator that SEA 483 may not be sufficiently
narrowly tailored to survive heightened scrutiny. Crawford has
also already been criticized for "[d]eferr[ing] to Indiana's decision
to justify a law that created an additional prerequisite to voting
with, at best, very little analysis into whether the law addressed the
type of fraud that the state claimed to be fighting ... ,,2"8 Without
careful analysis as to whether the specific interest asserted by the
state is being met, the provision cannot be regarded as narrowly
tailored to achieve the state's attempt at deterring in-person voter
fraud. Likewise, the Crawford plurality itself noted the lack of
recorded evidence offered by the state in support of its interest in
preventing in-person voter fraud.219 It seems unlikely that a
provision could be sufficiently narrowly tailored when there is a
lack of empirical evidence identifying the specific aspects of the
issue that it seeks to remedy. In the context of voter fraud, a
provision that purports to prevent such fraud cannot be specifically
addressed to solve it without first detecting the unique sources and
causes of the problem.
As stated by the dissenting opinions, Indiana's provisions
under SEA 483 are not only "one of the most restrictive in the
country," 220 but also are more restrictive than those recommended
by the Carter-Baker Report-a nationally commissioned study
recommending the states to enact photo-identification election
requirements. z2 1 In its report, the Carter-Baker commission
216. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1613 (citing IND. CODE § 9-24-16-10(b) (West
Supp. 2007)).
217. Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 954 (7th Cir.
2007).
218. Benson, supra note 54, at 18.
219. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1619.
220. Id. at 1634 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for Current and Former
State Secretaries of State as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 27-30,
Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008) (No. 07-25)).
221. Id. at 1643-45 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see supra note 164.
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recommended a certain means by which states can achieve the
same goals asserted by Indiana in Crawford; however, the
provisions enacted by SEA 483 do not follow the statutory
proposition suggested by the Carter-Baker Report.222 Justice
Breyer stated in his dissent that "[t]he Carter-Baker Commission
conditioned its recommendation upon the [s]tates' willingness to
ensure that the requisite photo IDs 'be easily available and issued
free of charge' and that the requirement be 'phased in' over two
federal election cycles, to ease the transition." He added that
"Indiana's law fails to satisfy these aspects of the Commission's
recommendation. 2
23
Therefore, it is clear that because the Carter-Baker Report
developed a statutory scheme for voter identification that was less
restrictive than the provisions enacted by the state of Indiana, SEA
483 was not sufficiently narrowly tailored to achieve its asserted
interests.
Under this heightened scrutiny analysis, the challenged statute
must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling interest asserted
by the state as justification for imposing a burden on a fundamental
right. SEA 483 cannot be upheld as constitutional under this
standard. Although Indiana's interest in preventing in-person voter
fraud is legitimate, and possibly even compelling, the enacted
provisions simply do not meet the standard of being necessary to
achieve that interest. The provisions enacted under SEA 483 must
then be deemed unconstitutional as an impermissible burden on the
fundamental right to vote. Furthermore, SEA 483's combination of
restrictive provisions and lack of evidentiary support arguably
renders it unconstitutional under the Anderson balancing test
employed in Crawford. In fact, it appears that the only standard
under which SEA 483 is truly constitutional is rational basis
review.
Despite the logical conclusion that heightened scrutiny is the
appropriate standard of review for voting rights cases, Justice
Scalia asserted in his Crawford concurrence that "[s]trict scrutiny
is appropriate only if the burden is severe. 224 Justice Scalia cited
just one case, Clingman v. Beaver,225 when making this statement.
222. Crawford, 128 S. Ct. at 1643-44 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing
COMM'N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, supra note 164, § 2.5, at 18-2 1).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1624 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Clingman v. Beaver, 544
U.S. 581, 592 (2005)).
225. 544 U.S. 581 (2005) (holding that an election provision that opened the
primary to only registered members of the party and registered independents did
not violate the petitioners' First Amendment rights to freedom of political
association).
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A clear reading of Clingman, however, indicates that the support
for this assertion was taken out of context. The Clingman Court
stated, in pertinent part, "But not every electoral law that burdens
associational rights is subject to strict scrutiny. Instead ... strict
scrutiny is appropriate only if the burden is severe., 226 This only
establishes that the "severe burden" requirement is a prerequisite
for challenges of provisions that burden the First Amendment right
to political association. It does not necessarily follow from
Clingman that a severe burden must be shown in the case of all
rights that are subject to strict scrutiny. As previously discussed,
SEA 483 is a direct burden on the fundamental right to vote, not an
issue of political association.227 Nonetheless, there are additional
concerns regarding the possibility of this severe burden
requirement.
While Crawford's plurality opinion made no mention of a
severe burden requirement in its analysis, the language in prior
jurisprudence implies that such a burden may be required in order
for heightened scrutiny to be applicable. The Burdick Court, for
example, stated that "when those [First and Fourteenth
Amendment Rights] are subjected to 'severe' restrictions, the
regulation must be 'narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of
compelling importance. ' ' 22 This assertion arguably lacks an
explicit mention of a severe burden requirement for the application
of a heightened scrutiny analysis. Conversely, it simply requires
that heightened scrutiny be applied when such severe restrictions
are present. However, the language undoubtedly gives rise to the
possibility that, even if not currently required by the Court, the
showing of such a burden may be necessary in future cases to
trigger the application of heightened scrutiny. Regardless of the
Court's current position on this issue, such a requirement would
pose a number of potential problems for courts in the future.
It is immediately obvious that there is a highly subjective
element to the meaning of the phrase "severe burden." Without a
clear definition of what exactly constitutes a burden that is
"severe," courts will certainly run into several difficulties. One
problem is the lack of clarity with regard to the factors that should
be considered in an evaluation of a burden's severity. There are a
variety of possible considerations, including (but not limited to) the
number of people burdened, the degree to which those people are
burdened, and the nature of the burden. Without even knowing the
226. Id. at 592 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
227. See discussion supra Part [V.A. 1.
228. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting Norman v.
Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289 (1992)).
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factors to be considered-not to mention the weight that should be
given to each factor-courts will be unable to make consistent
determinations of the asserted injuries. The more significant
difficulty, though, is the absence of a threshold requirement for
severity. If there is no set standard, courts will not be able to
adequately assess the impact of the burden.
The hypothetical ramifications of this standard's subjectivity
are significant. Judges will constantly disagree over which factors
should be given the most weight and whether the injuries asserted
by petitioners meet the requirement of severity. Petitioners
themselves will be without guidance as to whether their claims are
sufficient to invoke heightened scrutiny. The overall consistency of
decisions with regard to voting rights will suffer. Even if judges
attempt to define "severe burden," the task will be far from easy,
especially considering the number of possible "burdens" that
petitioners may allege.
Courts may choose to define the severe burden standard in a
way that parallels the undue burden standard set forth in Planned
229Parenthood v. Casey (Casey). Under Casey, which addressed
abortion rights, an undue burden exists if "a state regulation has the
purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a
woman seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus." '23 The "undue
burden" discussed in Casey seems comparable to the potential
"severe burden" requirement because both standards look at the
asserted injury to a fundamental right in order to determine the
constitutionality of a state regulation. Furthermore, the right to an
abortion, like the right to vote, is an unenumerated fundamental
right.23' The similarity between these two standards is initially
troubling. If it required the showing of a severe burden, courts
would essentially be treating the right to vote-a right that is
entitled to a great deal of protection-in a manner similar to the
arguably less-protected right to an abortion.23
2
Notwithstanding this odd contrast between the treatment of the
right to vote and the right to an abortion, the undue burden
229. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
230. Id. at 877.
231. Id at 926-27.
232. See id at 951-52. The Casey dissent argued against the Roe Court's
characterization of a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy as
"fundamental." Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). It stated that "in
terming this right fundamental, the Court in Roe read the earlier opinions upon
which it based its decision much too broadly." Id. "Unlike marriage, procreation
and contraception," the dissent continued, "abortion 'involves the purposeful
termination of a potential life."' Id. at 952 (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, 325 (1980)).
20101 NOTE 1057
8LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
standard set forth in Casey provides an interesting perspective
when applied in the voting rights context. Under Casey, a
provision is invalid if it "has the purpose or effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman" seeking an abortion
before the fetus is viable.233 Applying this standard to the right to
vote, it follows that a petitioner can successfully demonstrate an
undue burden without even addressing the legislative intent of the
provision, the issue of whether the burden ultimately prevented any
registered voters from actually casting a ballot, or the number of
voters affected by the burden. Therefore, if courts define the severe
burden standard in a manner similar to Casey's undue burden
standard, a petitioner would arguably be able to trigger the
application of heightened scrutiny even more easily than under the
current standard.
Setting aside all speculation regarding the possible definitions
of a severe burden standard, such a requirement is ultimately
inappropriate because of its clear departure from the standard set
forth in Harper. The Harper Court did not require any showing of
a severe burden when it applied heightened scrutiny to the Virginia
poll tax provision. 234 Conversely, the Court emphatically struck
down an annual poll tax of just $1.50,235 stating that it was "the
same whether the citizen, otherwise qualified to vote, has $1.50 in
his pocket or nothing at all, pays the fee or fails to pay it."'2 36 The
Harper Court did not even discuss the asserted burdens, declaring
the tax unconstitutional because "'the opportunity for equal
participation by all voters in the election of state legislators' is
required., 237 The Harper Court clearly focused on the fundamental
nature of the right to vote without regard to the asserted burdens
when it applied heightened scrutiny and declared the poll tax
unconstitutional. Accordingly, the severe burden standard conflicts
with the principles expounded in Harper and should not be a
prerequisite to the application of heightened scrutiny in the context
of voting rights.
Moreover, prospective plaintiffs have a right, as individuals, to
challenge the constitutionality of a provision if they are injured or
burdened as a result of the provision.238 In order for a plaintiff's
claim to be subject to heightened scrutiny, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that the burden imposed by the provision is severe.
233. Id. at 877 (emphasis added).
234. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
235. Id. at664n.1.
236. Id. at 668.
237. Id. at 670 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 566 (1964)).
238. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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However, without adopting a standard similar to Casey's undue
burden standard, the Court is unlikely to ever find a severe burden
when a single plaintiff claims an injury to himself alone.
Furthermore, it can be inferred from the Crawford plurality's
analysis that, under the Anderson balancing test, a significant
portion of an election provision's constitutional assessment
considers the number of voters that are adversely affected by the
regulation. It follows that, unless an individual plaintiffs claim is
analyzed under a heightened standard of scrutiny without the
requirement of a severe burden, the plaintiff will not be entitled to
any relief.
By establishing a requirement that plaintiffs demonstrate a
severe burden before heightened scrutiny is applied-if they
choose to do so-the courts will not only be stuck with a
subjective rule that departs from established jurisprudence, but also
will be left with a rule that will deprive citizens of the unique
constitutional safeguards that are given to the most important and
most valued of rights. Conversely, under the proposed return to the
Harpcr standard of heightened scrutiny, any prospective
requirement of a severe burden would be both unnecessary and
inappropriate.
V. CONCLUSION
The right to vote is a right that has been established as
fundamental under the Constitution. Because of its fundamental
nature, it is necessary that courts employ heightened scrutiny when
evaluating any restriction that imposes a direct burden on this
right. This heightened scrutiny analysis is the only way that the
fundamental right to vote can be adequately protected from
infringements that threaten to unreasonably burden qualified voters
from exercising the franchise.
Crawford is a clear example of how the right to vote is no
longer treated as the fundamental right that it truly is. By
upholding SEA 483 under a watered-down version of the original
Anderson balance, the Crawford Court essentially demoted the
right to vote from its status as fundamental by applying an
inappropriate standard. Under this reasoning, the door is open for
increasingly restrictive state statutes that further burden those who
wish to participate in the political process. The photo identification
requirements imposed by SEA 483 could be the beginning of a
nationwide trend in favor of a burdensome identification
requirement for all voters. Additionally, with the possibility of a
severe burden requirement in order to trigger the application of a
heightened level of scrutiny, courts may be willing to give an
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increasing amount of deference to the interests asserted by the
government. By returning to Harper's standard of heightened
scrutiny when dealing with provisions that directly infringe upon
the fundamental right to vote, however, courts can preserve this
right and ensure that the franchise is available to all voters who are
qualified under the currently established constitutional
requirements.
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